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This paper discusses the role of companies in high-lati-
tude regions, which are conceptualized as socially and 
economically mediated ecosystems, and identiﬁes a num-
ber of important social actors within the business environ-
ment. We present three examples of corporate activity at 
high latitudes and discuss a variety of common threads. 
Notably, we argue that business theory and practice needs 
to move beyond a narrow social or economic concept of 
organizational resilience and embrace the ecological resil-
ience of high-latitude regions as a business management 
goal. We also suggest that regional ecosystem resilience 
needs to become a meaningful measure of sustainable 
corporate governance, one that corporate boards of direc-
tors can review and commit to. The paper concludes with a 
call for a detailed research agenda on the role of transna-
tional and national companies within high-latitude regions.
INTRODUCTION
In February 2003, British Petroleum (BP) agreed to pay 6.75 
billion USD for a 50% stake in what will be the third largest 
Russian oil producer (1). On 16 May 2003 Royal Dutch/Shell 
announced a 10 USD billion investment in Sakhalin II in eastern 
Russian – making it the biggest oil and gas project in the world 
(2). Such development is not new. Arctic and boreal regions 
have been subject to externally driven economic development 
for well over a hundred years, with the North American Gold 
Rush in the 1890s as an early example. However, large-scale 
development by transnational and national corporations is be-
coming increasingly common in these eco-
systems. At the same time, the high latitude 
regions are showing increasing ecological 
and social vulnerability (3). In this paper, 
we argue for the need to study the role of 
companies in the dynamics of ecosystem 
change in order to better understand the 
vulnerability of high-latitude regions.
 First, we discuss the role of companies 
in high-latitude regions, which are concep-
tualized as socially and economically me-
diated ecosystems, and identify a number 
of other important social actors within the 
business environment. Then we present 
three examples of corporate activity at high 
latitudes and discuss a variety of common 
threads. Notably, we argue for the need for 
business theory and practice to move be-
yond a social or economic concept of orga-
nizational resilience and embrace the eco-
logical resilience of high-latitude regions 
as a business management goal. We also 
suggest that regional ecosystem resilience 
needs to become a meaningful measure of 
sustainable corporate governance, one that corporate boards of 
directors can review and commit to. Finally, we conclude with 
a call for a detailed research agenda on the role of transnational 
and national companies within high-latitude regions.
HIGH-LATITUDE REGIONS AS SOCIALLY AND 
ECONOMICALLY MEDIATED ECOSYSTEMS
The sustainability of high-latitude ecosystems depends upon 
their degree of resilience. According to Folke et al. (4) resil-
ience of social-ecological systems is related to i) the magnitude 
of shock that the system can absorb and remain within a given 
state, ii) the degree to which the system is capable of self-orga-
nization, and iii) the degree to which the system can build capac-
ity for learning and adaptation. From an ecological perspective, 
resilience is concerned with the long-term capacity of an ecosys-
tem to rejuvenate itself (5).
 The sustainability of high-latitude ecosystems is impacted 
by ecological, social, and economic systems at local, regional 
and global scales (Fig. 1). The business environment intercon-
nects these systems and provides important feedbacks that af-
fect the long-term functioning of high-latitude regions (6). In 
systems thinking, a positive feedback ampliﬁes the change in 
input, pushing the system towards greater change, whereas a 
negative feedback counteracts this and helps to maintain the 
status quo (7). Positive feedbacks can lead to upward spirals 
of change (e.g. greater and greater proﬁt) or downward spirals 
of change (e.g. fewer and fewer ecological resources). How-
ever, increasing proﬁt at the expense of ecological resources 
may not necessarily be a trade-off; some companies and busi-
Figure 1. A social-ecological system consists of ecological and social subsystems that 
strongly inﬂuence one another at local and regional scales. For each subsystem there are 
external factors (e.g. regional climate and international markets) that are not inﬂuenced by 
local conditions (known as state factors by ecologists) and internal factors (e.g. institutions 
or disturbances), which respond to external factors and which both affect, and are affected 
by local processes (known as interactive controls by ecologists) (adapted from 4).
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ness academics believe that growth in shareholder value and 
ecological sustainability can occur simultaneously (8). Social 
and economic processes create webs of positive and negative 
feedbacks that may be structurally similar to, or different from, 
those of ecological systems (6). Whereas ecological feedbacks 
have a strong physical basis, business feedbacks are socially 
and economically mediated and are somewhat less predictable. 
A business environment can thus create and respond to posi-
tive and negative feedback loops in an economic, social and 
ecological sense (6).
 The pressure to develop high-latitude regions continues as so-
cial and economic feedbacks in other parts of the globe demand 
more products and services. These economic links exert strong 
pressure on high-latitude ecosystems but are largely decoupled 
from speciﬁc locations. From a corporate perspective, high lati-
tudes house valuable natural resources such as oil and gas, hy-
dro-electricity, forest products, minerals and metals, ﬁsheries, 
and increasingly act as a site for tourism. Infrastructure develop-
ment—ports, pipelines, roads, airports, shipping routes—used 
to facilitate economic development plans, carries additional eco-
nomic opportunities and potential ecological costs. Multinational 
companies and their governmental counterparts in many coun-
tries continue to eye high-latitude resources as a bounty waiting 
to be exploited. In addition to the direct impact of companies 
operating within the geographical boundaries of high-latitude 
regions, companies indirectly impact the system through activi-
ties at lower latitudes, such as CO2 emissions that contribute to 
global climate change, and by creating suitable conditions and 
environments for invasive species, which in turn may negatively 
affect the native biota.
 Changes in high-latitude ecosystems have immediate impli-
cations for companies functioning in the north. For example, 
global warming has begun to interfere with efforts to discover 
more oil in Alaska (9). Cod in the North Sea is nearly extinct, 
which directly affects the viability of the European ﬁshing 
industry. Exxon is still feeling the negative effects from the 
Alaska oil spill, and a federal court ruled that the company 
“cannot return to the Alaska sound it fouled 13 years ago with 
nearly 11 million gallons of crude.” (10). On the other hand, 
climate change can present new business opportunities in high-
latitude regions. For example, decreasing sea ice may result 
in the opening up the Northwest Passage between the Atlantic 
and Paciﬁc Oceans, as well as the Northern Sea Route in the 
Russian Arctic, which creates new opportunities for transpor-
tation and for oil and gas exploration and development, while 
at the same time creating additional stress on the ecological 
resilience of such systems (11).
 From a systems perspective, companies are active manag-
ers that create and react to positive and negative feedback loops 
within their business system. Most business strategies are de-
signed to generate positive feedback loops that enhance corpo-
rate advantages (e.g. investment in advertising to create more 
demand, which increases proﬁts; investment in infrastructure 
to produce more products, which increases income). This be-
havior creates additional feedback loops that connect business 
activities to ecological systems. Unless companies notice and 
constructively manage these linkages, the resulting malfunction-
ing or incomplete feedbacks between the social, economic and 
ecological systems can reduce regional resilience. Folke et al. 
(4) suggest that “[m]anagement can destroy or build resilience, 
depending on how the social-ecological system organizes itself 
in response to management actions.” Management practices that 
focus on ﬂexibility and adaptive learning can help build system 
resilience (12).
 Some companies have begun to recognize the importance of 
ecosystem sustainability and have initiated changes in business 
behavior toward the environment. However, a more common 
response to external social pressure for sustainability has been 
to manage the perceptions and actions of the broader social and 
economic system through advertising and public relations and 
thus reduce the threat of positive social feedback, rather than 
to address the ecological feedbacks directly. For instance, the 
continuing demand by international capital markets for increas-
ing proﬁts tends to create a positive economic feedback that cre-
ates an upward spiral for companies, yet may simultaneously 
generate a positive feedback leading to a downward spiral in the 
availability of ecological resources that are the basis of this prof-
it. Similarly, the recent massive power blackout along the east-
ern seaboard of the USA and Canada—where up to 50 million 
people lost power—provided new ‘social and economic’ feed-
back to proponents of oil drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge (ANWR), in which consumer demand for energy led to 
public support for oil drilling in the ANWR, which could aug-
ment energy use. If drilling in the ANWR were to proceed, the 
resulting environmental impacts could generate additional so-
cial-ecological feedback loops that were not a component of the 
original corporate strategy.
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING HIGH-LATITUDE 
RESILIENCE
Several other groups inﬂuence high-latitude ecological resil-
ience via their role within the business environment. We brieﬂy 
identify the importance of some of these actors.
 Governments and regional bodies like the European Union 
play a critical role in maintaining the sustainability of high-lati-
tude ecosystems and regulating the impact of companies on these 
areas through positive and negative feedback. For instance, the 
European Union has a “Northern Dimension Action Plan” (13), 
which comprises the external and cross-border policies of the 
European Union covering the Baltic Sea region, Arctic Sea re-
gion and North West Russia. It facilitates trade and economic 
relations particularly in energy, transportation and telecommu-
nications, while at the same time seeking to minimize pollution 
or other side effects of unsustainable development.
 Such governmental and regional directives can facilitate 
feedbacks that have either positive or negative effects on eco-
systems. For example, by promoting unrestricted development 
in this region, they create a positive feedback in which compa-
nies are encouraged to extract resources as cheaply as possible 
without considering the long-term environmental consequences. 
This positive feedback loop leads to a progressively degraded 
environment. Alternatively, they can promote a negative feed-
back that stabilizes long-term development of the region by 
linking environmental performance of ﬁrms already active in 
the region with opportunities for continued development.
 International ﬁnancing institutions can also inﬂuence feed-
backs because they provide much of the needed ﬁnancing for 
corporate activities, particularly in emerging economies like 
Russia. Export credit agencies and banks from many countries 
are actively encouraging economic development in high-lati-
tude regions. For example, the European Bank of Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD), the European Investment 
Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, and the World Bank (along 
with the European Commission, the Russian Federation, the 
Danish, Finnish, and Swedish governments) are collabora-
tors in the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership 
(NDEP) which supports projects in water, wastewater, solid 
waste, energy efﬁciency and nuclear waste management (14). 
International capital markets can also help curb high-latitude 
investment through pressure from ethical investor groups, such 
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as Henderson Global Investors, or from the Dow Jones Sus-
tainability Index, which rank companies on their social and 
environmental performance.
 Consumers have a key role to play in both demanding that 
companies behave more sustainably, and conversely in demand-
ing more opportunities for consumption. On the one hand, con-
sumers who support the Greenpeace/Friends of the Earth boy-
cott against Exxon Mobil for its role in sabotaging international 
action on climate change (15), generate a negative feedback that 
constrains and stabilizes business dynamics, which in turn gen-
erate additional negative feedbacks to ensure ecosystem sustain-
ability. On the other hand, consumers continue to demand greater 
energy resources – a positive business feedback that negatively 
affects the environment.
 The important roles that civil society plays in high-latitude 
sustainability provide a mixture of feedbacks, depending upon 
the group or level of analysis. For instance, the agreement be-
tween the Grand Council of the Crees and Hydro-Québec on 
the proposed Eastmain hydroelectric project created a positive 
feedback that made it more likely that indigenous people would 
support the project since the agreement provides the Cree with 
CAD 3.5 billion USD (USD 2.27 billion) over 50 years (16–18). 
However, there was a signiﬁcant portion of the local Cree popu-
lation (31%) and several NGOs that opposed the project, leading 
to a negative feedback that may reduce the likelihood that the 
project will proceed.
HIGH-LATITUDE RESILIENCE AND 
BUSINESS THEORY
There are at least two avenues to help bring 
a deeper understanding of high-latitude 
sustainability into corporate boardrooms: 
i) through an expanded concept of organi-
zational resilience that includes measures 
of regional ecosystem resilience; and ii) 
through corporate governance mecha-
nisms.
 Resilience is a concept that is well recognized in the corporate 
world. The concept typically refers to the social or economic re-
silience of corporate employees, of organizational teams, specif-
ic companies, and/or industries in the face of social or economic 
stress or vulnerability (19, 20). This quote from Lord Browne, 
the CEO of BP, provides a typical example of this perspective: 
“Stepping back I think we can best explain our strategy as a 
determination to have the best position for growth in an indus-
try which is showing that it has great resilience even in volatile 
economic times.” (21). In the wake of 9/11, American business 
scholars have increasingly focused on the need for leadership 
resilience in the face of external socio-political (terrorist) crisis 
(22). This approach to organizational resilience renders it a ‘de-
natured’ concept (23) that largely ignores feedbacks to ecologi-
cal components of the system (for exceptions, 12, 24). The fact 
that resilience is an integral part of corporate strategies suggests, 
however, that the concept could be expanded to include ecologi-
cal dimensions without a complete shift in corporate paradigm.
 Corporations are formally governed and controlled by their 
boards of directors. Boards typically represent shareholder in-
terests, but stakeholder interests are increasingly entering the 
boardroom (25). Board responsibilities can be distinguished by 
conformance vs. performance roles and also by outward vs in-
ward-looking roles (25) (Fig. 2). Inside the corporation, other 
committees can also have useful governance functions, such as 
Health, Safety, and Environment Committees (HSECs). These 
can be viewed as a mixture of positive and negative feedbacks. 
Accountability and monitoring allow past performance to be 
evaluated; if it meets the goals of the corporation, the strategy is 
supported; if it is unsuccessful, the strategy is changed. Policy-
making seeks to project this behavior into the future. The net ef-
fect is to stabilize corporate behavior to pursue the stated goals. 
Strategy formation seeks to promote a positive feedback that 
enhances corporate advantage.
 Both boards and HSECs could be useful governance mecha-
nisms to help companies monitor and plan for regional ecosys-
tem resilience. Boards and committees rely upon performance 
indicators to measure past and present orientation and also upon 
predictive targets to help shape future plans. Typically, these 
measures are ﬁnancial in nature, but some progressive compa-
nies also prepare environmental and social reports. However, 
few (if any) measures of corporate environmental and social 
performance integrate measures of social-ecological resilience. 
Nevertheless, if indicators of resilience did enter the boardroom, 
then one can imagine a board or HSEC committee reviewing 
past and present corporate performance in terms of regional 
social-ecological resilience. From a future orientation, boards 
could help set targets for resilience (and also help set appropriate 
management thresholds), and could ensure that plans and formal 
corporate policies on regional resilience are established. Yet the 
‘denatured’ corporate perspective on resilience often results in 
a distorted approach to governance, which is not ecologically 
embedded (16) in a concrete sense.
Exploring the Role of Companies in the Resilience of High-
latitude Ecosystems: Three Cases
In this section, we present three examples of transnational and 
large national companies that are currently impacting high-lati-
tude regions.
Case 1: Forest Industry in Finland
In Finland, as in many other boreal countries, forests and for-
estry are an important source of economic wealth. Thus, forests 
have long been a battleﬁeld for a variety of interests, but con-
ﬂicts between conservationists and those emphasizing economic 
output from forests (e.g. forest industry) have intensiﬁed during 
recent decades. The developments leading to the situation, and 
consequent changes in forestry practices, have three interlinked 
components: i) forestry operations have intensiﬁed; ii) recre-
ational needs have increased; and iii) the environmental move-
ment has developed and gained strength. Thus, during the past 
decades forests have become objects of an increasing number of 
interests and interest groups with different and clashing views 
about forest management.
 The effort to enhance economic growth is often seen as the 
principal cause of the intensiﬁcation of forestry. Intensive and 
efﬁcient forest management yield better economic returns and 
lead to increased living standards, and thus increased demand 
for recreational use of forests. On the other hand, the same for-
Conformance Roles (past 
and present oriented)
Performance Roles (future oriented)
Outward 
Looking
Accountability – providing 
feedback to shareholders and 
other stakeholders
Strategy formation – developing plans for the ﬁrmʼs 
interaction with the external environment (e.g., 
strategic alliances, proﬁt strategies, ﬁnancing)
Inward 
Looking
Monitoring – questioning, 
judging and supervising 
management
Policy making – establishing rules and norms to 
guide the company in achieving its strategic goals
Figure 2: The roles and responsibilities of Boards of Directors (15).
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estry that produced more economic growth and thereby wealth, 
has been perceived to cause deterioration of the forest environ-
ment. Consequently, the environmental movement has gained 
strength. Thus, forest conﬂicts are intimately linked with social 
development in industrialized countries during the past decades, 
with such phenomena as urbanization, continued industrializa-
tion, and increased standard of living leading to changed values 
among people.
 Interestingly, some Finnish researchers claim that forest-re-
lated conﬂicts were partly caused—or at least aggravated—by 
the inability of forest industry and other forestry professionals 
to adapt their views and approaches to accommodate changes in 
the society. The previous criticism towards forest management 
had focused on biological issues (such as the biological effects 
of herbicide and pesticide use, and acid rain) and on economic 
and technological issues. Therefore, forestry professionals did 
not have the tools to cope with the new type of criticism that 
dealt with values, social issues, recreational demands, and the 
new concept of biodiversity. The new situation led to confusion 
among forestry professionals and consequently an inability to 
ﬁnd a common strategy to deal with the new criticisms (26). 
Signiﬁcant changes in this state of affairs have taken place in the 
Finnish forest management procedures during the past decade.
 One of the pressures contributing to changes in the northern 
boreal forest sector is the so-called ‘market pressure’, i.e. con-
sumers demanding changes in forest management by selecting 
the most environmentally friendly products. There are contradic-
tory views about whether market pressure is exerted by ordinary 
consumers demanding wood products from forests treated with 
environmentally friendly logging methods or is market pressure 
created by vocal and strong environmental groups acting as rep-
resentatives of consumers. Nevertheless, environmental groups 
are one of the drivers of changes in boreal forest management, 
for instance, by inﬂuencing buyer companies of wood-based 
products and thereby forcing the producers to change forestry 
methods.
 An illustrative example of the signiﬁcance of market pressure 
and environmental groups is the declaration of the large German 
publishing house Axel Springer Verlag which sets strict envi-
ronmental standards for their paper suppliers. These six Forestry 
Standards for the suppliers have been in force since 1995 (27):
i) Sustainability: Harvesting more timber than will re-grow is 
prohibited.
ii) Biodiversity: Forestry shall not endanger animal or plant 
species.
iii) Control: The paper manufacturer as a purchaser of timber 
must perform eco-controls.
iv) Training: The paper manufacturer must ensure that the nec-
essary ecological knowledge is made available to personnel 
(for example, forest workers).
v) Indigenous population: The paper manufacturer must take 
the indigenous people (for example, the Saami in Northern 
Scandinavia) into consideration.
vi) Information: The paper manufacturer must keep the public 
informed of the advances made in environmental protection, 
but also of the problems encountered.
Case 2: Oil Companies and Resilience of Russian High-lati-
tude Regions
The Russian Arctic, including its seabed, may well become one 
of the main sources of oil in the 21st century. The decreasing oil 
resources of the North Sea may last for only another 25 years, so 
Europe may soon be importing up to 85% of its energy supplies. 
At present, Russia provides only about 20% of Europe’s natural 
gas needs and 16% of its oil. In general, Russia faces enormous 
transport problems in getting its petroleum resources, much of 
it deep in Siberia, to export markets. This makes scenarios for 
shipping oil to North America proﬁtable only at times of high 
prices. At present, most of Russia’s oil and gas goes to Europe. 
In the short term, U.S. oil companies could raise Russia’s oil 
output further by investing more there. To date, however, U.S. 
and multinational companies have been reluctant to invest there 
because of shifting tax codes and regulatory policies and have 
called for binding legislation before investing more money in 
the country. Speciﬁcally, they have been unwilling to do this 
without the production-sharing agreements that Russia’s Duma 
has been reluctant to grant foreign ﬁrms (28).
 Western companies began exploring projects in Russia even 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but more than a decade 
later they can point to few successes after combined investments 
of more than USD 5 billion. For example, Shell, the world’s 
second largest oil ﬁrm, signed a memorandum at the end of the 
1990s to develop oil and gas condensate deposits at Gazprom’s 
huge Zapolyarnoye gas ﬁeld in Western Siberia, but the deal 
was never ﬁnalized. BP, the world’s third largest oil ﬁrm, has 
had extensive projects in the Russian north via its 50% interest 
in Tyumen Oil (TNK), which produces 1.2 million barrels per 
day (bpd) and has reserves of 5.2 billion bbl. At the end of June 
2003, U.K. Prime Minister Blair and Russian President Putin 
jointly announced the creation of a new oil company, TNK-BP, 
which will lead to a further investment of more than USD 6 bil-
lion by BP in Russia.
 As the world’s No. 2 oil exporter, Russia is seeking new 
markets outside Europe, while the U.S., the world’s largest oil 
consumer, wants to cut its reliance on the oil-rich but volatile 
Middle East. Under this scenario, Murmansk—Russia’s only 
ice-free arctic port—would become the main port for oil export 
to the U.S. By 2010, Russian companies hope to cover 10-15% 
of crude oil consumption in the U.S. Indeed, in November 2002 
Presidents Bush and Putin pledged to strengthen energy ties be-
tween their two countries. The project is part of a blossoming re-
lationship between the former Cold War rivals. However, Wash-
ington wants more than simply increased Russian oil imports 
out of its new energy relationship with Moscow. It is also keen 
to open Russia’s vast oil reserves to U.S. investors. One reason 
why big Western companies are prepared to risk a return to Rus-
sia is the price of oil. Diving to USD 10 a barrel in 1998, it has 
climbed steadily thereafter and, despite a downward dip after the 
terrorist strikes of September 11, has recently been buoyed by 
tensions in the Middle East.
 In general, ecosystem degradation from petroleum extrac-
tion has been more extensive in the Russian Arctic than in North 
American developments. Part of the reason is that many of the 
largest oil and gas ﬁelds were ﬁrst identiﬁed and tapped during 
Soviet times. Those original ﬁelds were developed recklessly 
with little or no concern for the technical longevity of the ﬁelds 
or the environmental damage resulting from exploration and ex-
ploitation. It is certain that Russia will need foreign expertise 
in both extraction and environmental mitigation, in addition to 
capital investments, to develop new ﬁelds in the Arctic. The re-
cent merger of BP with TNK raises some hope for mitigation as 
its new Russian ﬁelds are developed. In the 1990s, Gazprom, 
and other Russian companies began selling shares on the inter-
national stock market. Most have poor records of environmental 
and cultural protection. Therefore, long-term multinational in-
vestment has at least the potential to be beneﬁcial, if interna-
tional standards and protocols for mitigation are instituted and 
adhered to.
© Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2004
http://www.ambio.kva.se
Ambio Vol. 33 No. 6, August 2004 375
improved environmental management practices that can improve 
ecosystem functioning. On the other, economic and political (so-
cial) feedback from the Russian government de-emphasizes the 
importance of managing for ecosystem sustainability.
 The last case, on Beyond Petroleum, highlights the ability of 
companies to create powerful social feedback via advertising. 
What is not clear is the degree of substance behind the public re-
lations exercise (37). BP’s marketing approach can be described 
in the context of feedbacks. First, the campaign is designed as 
a positive social and economic feedback intended to change 
business behavior: more ecologically minded consumers lead 
to more ecologically minded corporations, which lead to more 
ecologically minded consumers, etc. If successful, this could ini-
tiate a positive feedback for social-ecological change in which 
reduced corporate energy consumption reduces the projected 
aerial extent of oil development, which reduces costs and adds 
customers, which causes more corporations to engage in this be-
havior. However, the multi-million dollar campaign may also 
do much to socially mediate BP’s corporate reputation, and thus 
reduce social pressure for change – i.e. the public relations mes-
sage may act as negative social feedback and help the company 
resist further change.
 While companies may be increasingly aware of the need to 
manage ecosystems and to pay attention to environmental indi-
cators, such as the GRI, such actions may not be sustainable if 
ecosystem resilience has not been integrated into a company’s 
culture and formal governance mechanism. That is, despite good 
intentions, companies may operate with a distorted or limited 
understanding of effective ecosystem resilience. While ﬂex-
ibility and learning is key (12), further efforts at new learning, 
across companies and industries, must be made. For instance, 
the forestry standards identiﬁed for Axel Springer Verlag are a 
good start, but the forest industry could be more proactive by 
emphasizing their ongoing commitment to sustainable forestry 
and more speciﬁcally, regional resilience. The examples set by 
proactive forest companies and companies like BP could en-
courage and ‘force’ other companies to follow suit if social and 
economic expectations (among consumers, civil society, gov-
ernments and international ﬁnancing institutions) shift towards 
regional resilience and sustainability. However, one of the dif-
ﬁculties in bringing ecological resilience into the boardroom 
may be the difference in time scales between corporate thinking 
and ecological time spans. Many companies work in rather short 
time scales (years or tens of years) as compared to high-latitude 
ecosystems that may require hundreds of years to recover (if 
they have enough resilience) from human-caused disturbance.
Implications: The Pressing Need for a High-latitude Corpo-
rate Research Agenda
In this paper, we argue that the resilience of high-latitude regions 
depends, in part, on the actions of transnational and national com-
panies. Such companies may directly impact the region through 
their daily operations, while others may have indirect impacts 
through their contribution to global processes such as climate 
change. While the resilience of high latitude regions is increas-
ingly being strained, we suggest that the companies who bear 
some responsibility for this are more focused on ensuring social 
and economic resilience, perhaps at the expense of ecological 
resilience. That is, the feedback loop from these ecosystems and 
the boardroom may be weak in terms of ecological feedback but 
strong in terms of social and economic feedback loops. Yet, if 
ecosystem resilience may depend upon the effective functioning 
of feedbacks, a central question that emerges from our paper is 
how to ensure that high-latitude feedbacks and resilience enters 
the corporate boardroom in a meaningful way?
Case 3: Beyond Petroleum
The UK-based BP is one of the world’s largest oil and gas pro-
ducers and also has signiﬁcant investments in alternative energy, 
such as solar power. BP impacts high-latitude ecosystems both 
through its direct role in oil and gas production in areas such 
as Alaska and Russia, and indirectly through its overall contri-
bution to climate change. In 1997, BP was the ﬁrst petroleum 
company to publicly accept the need for the precautionary prin-
ciple with respect to climate change. BP also reports signiﬁcant 
reductions in emissions and makes a commitment to maintain 
this performance (29).
 Recently, BP has repositioned itself as a company that is 
“Beyond Petroleum,” and launched a new marketing campaign, 
entitled “BP on the street,” developed by award-winning adver-
tising agency Ogilvy and Mather Worldwide. BP’s advertising 
campaign takes a ‘reality TV’ approach by interviewing real 
people about their views on oil companies, energy needs, alter-
native fuels, etc. and positions BP as moving towards sustain-
ability while acknowledging that it is only starting to make a 
difference.
 Critics point out that the 2-year campaign cost USD 200 mil-
lion, which was the same amount that BP invested in renewable 
technologies over a 6-year period (30, 31). Thus, BP is investing 
as much in its sustainable image as it is in sustainable technol-
ogy and activity. Fortune, a key business magazine, offered this 
comment on the heavy use of marketing spin: “Well, please: If 
the world’s second largest oil company is beyond petroleum, 
FORTUNE is beyond words” (32).
 Since 2000, BP has been involved with the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI), the main global initiative to develop sustainable 
reporting measures based on sustainability indicators and prin-
ciples that enhance accountability, particularly completeness, 
clarity, relevance, transparency and auditability. BP also pre-
pares location reports, environmental performance by site and 
case studies (33). However, none of these localized efforts ef-
fectively bring in measures or predictions of regional resilience, 
such as regional economic stability in the face of ﬂuctuating oil 
prices or ecological recovery (rather than degradation) after oil 
development. BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy (34), an 
interactive web-based tool that helps viewers chart energy con-
sumption and production, has the ability to chart data by na-
tion. However, the data are not available by eco-regions, such 
as high-latitude areas, a missed opportunity to assess negative 
feedbacks that enhance regional sustainability.
DISCUSSION
Measures of high latitude ecosystem resilience (1) suggest that 
current and future stresses on these ecosystems may result in a 
severe loss of system resilience which may lead to alternative, 
undesired states in which the ecosystem differs fundamentally 
from its original state (35, 36). Our case studies illustrate that 
companies are important actors that create and react to feedback 
that affects high-latitude regions.
 The Finnish forestry case effectively demonstrates the power 
of social and economic (market) feedback (via supplier codes) in 
promoting increased sustainability in high-latitude ecosystems. 
The feedback has resulted in changes aimed at more ecologi-
cally sustainable forestry practices in Finland and in other bo-
real and high-latitude countries. This example clearly shows that 
consumers have a pivotal role to play in demanding that compa-
nies behave more sustainably.
 Oil development in Russia also demonstrates the importance 
of social and economic feedback, but with mixed results. On the 
one hand, foreign multinationals like Shell and BP may bring 
© Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2004
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 A number of related questions emerge from our paper: First, 
what would happen if transnational and national companies op-
erating in or impacting upon high-latitude regions began to man-
age for regional social-ecological resilience? Second, how can 
an expanded concept of organizational resilience, one that inte-
grates ecological resilience, meaningfully enter into the board-
rooms of key companies?
 In order to answer these questions, we believe that it is neces-
sary to identify which companies and other actors (Fig. 1) are 
involved in the region and to understand how these boardrooms 
are governed. We thus propose the need for a comprehensive 
audit to identify relevant corporate activity. This would in-
clude an analysis of corporate policies, programs, public rela-
tions strategies, and practices. In addition, it would be useful to 
identify other key actors such as the governments, international 
ﬁnancing institutions, as key consumer segments, and civil so-
ciety groups, which can help provide companies with important 
feedback. Next, an assessment of current corporate governance 
mechanisms is required and a plan for action needs to be devel-
oped. That is, what are the key corporate governance gaps by in-
dustry? What are the key mechanisms for effective governance? 
How can these be inﬂuenced? What government or EU policy 
options are available to encourage this process? And ﬁnally, how 
can we, as scholars, help make this happen?
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